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I.ARGUMENT 
A. The issue before the Court requires an application of law to undisputed facts. 
the Supreme Court's task on appeal is to ascertain whether the Industrial Commission 
properly applied the law to the facts of a case. Idaho Const. art. V, Section 9; Morgan v. 
Columbia Helicopters, Inc., 118 Idaho 347, 350, 796 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1990). 
Contrary to Employer's argument, however, the Commission's decision regarding course 
of employment is not a finding of fact that is beyond scrutiny on appeal. When discussing the 
course and scope analysis, this Court has held that there is a mixed question of law and fact: 
To determine whether Zolber's accident arose out of and in the course of his employment, 
the Commission necessarily had to determine the facts and circumstances of the case, and 
then apply the law of worker's compensation to those facts. Beebe v. Ho1ion, 77 Idaho 
388,390,293 P.2d 661, 662 (1956). Thus, the issue of whether Zolber's accident arose 
out of and in the course of his employment is a mixed question oflaw and fact... 
Reinstein v. McGregor Land and Livestock Co., 126 Idaho 156, 158, 879 P.2d 1089, 1091 
(1994). 
In the case presently before the Court, the pmiies stipulated to the relevant facts. The 
Commission's discussion of the facts is limited to one line: "The undisputed and stipulated facts 
are set forth below verbatim from the parties' Stipulation of Facts." R. 39. 
The Commission did not serve a fact-finding function in this case. Instead, the 
Commission applied the law to the undisputed facts. The Commission's decision is properly 
under review, as it is exclusively an application of law to the facts of the case. 
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is an "intervening" 
cause. 
Employer argues that despite the Commission's regular reliance on the compensable 
consequence doctrine, the Commission has never applied the compensable consequence doctrine 
when there is an intervening cause. By its very definition, as set forth by the Commission, the 
compensable consequence doctrine contemplates an "intervening" cause: "The application of the 
rule [ compensable consequence doctrine] is almost entirely limited to situations where a primary 
work-related injury is followed by a later nonwork-related injury." Anthony v. Connors Logging, 
Inc., 1990 IIC 0660 (September 1990). 
In Lee v. J.R. Simplot Co., 1996 IIC 0019 (January 1996), Lee injured herself when she 
tripped over a forklift at work. As a direct result of the work injury, Lee underwent two back 
surgeries. Ultimately Lee sought retraining. During the retraining program, Lee developed 
tendinitis and carpal tunnel syndrome. The retraining program was an intervening cause in much 
the same way the automobile collision was an intervening cause in the present case. Lee was not 
"doing the duty which she was employed to perform." Nor was retraining in the traditional 
course and scope of Lee's employment at Simplot. The Commission, nonetheless, found the 
tendinitis and carpal tunnel syndrome compensable consequences of her industrial injury. 
In Salvador2003 v. Fremont Compensation, 2003 IIC 0258 (April 2003), Salvador 
suffered a compensable back injury. As part of his medical treatment, Salvador was referred to 
the LifeFit Program. While participating in the LifeFit Program, a physical therapist required 
Salvador to perform exercises. The Commission found that Salvador injured his left shoulder 
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while performing overhead press exercises under his physical therapist's direction. Salvador was 
not hired by his employer to perform overhead press exercises. Overhead press exercises were 
not within the traditional course and scope of what Salvador was hired to do. Notwithstanding 
the intervening cause, the overhead press exercises, the Commission found the left shoulder 
injury was a compensable natural consequence of the primary injury. 
Perhaps the biggest distinguishing factor between the above-cited cases and the case 
presently before the Court is that Employer in the present case wielded much greater control 
over, and involvement in, the events resulting in Claimant's collision than the employers in Lee 
and Salvador. Consistent with prior Commission decisions and decisions by jurisdictions across 
the country, Claimant's injuries sustained in the motor vehicle collision are directly and causally 
tied to her initial compensable injury. Claimant's injuries sustained in the motor vehicle collision 
should be compensable under her workers' compensation claim. 
C. A finding of compensability in this case does not require a broad precedent that 
would cover unlimited less extreme circumstances. 
Employer argues that a finding of compensability will require a broad precedent which 
would cover unlimited less extreme circumstances. Employer's argument is refuted by history. 
Claimant requests that the Court utilize the same analysis applied in Grant v. 
Brownfield's Orthopedic & Prosthetic Co., 105 Idaho 542, 671 P.2d 455 (1983) to find 
Claimant's injuries sustained in the motor vehicle collision compensable. Employer does not 
address Grant and provides no argument as to why the Court should not apply the same test to 
the case presently before the Court. Applying the Grant analysis to the case before the Court 
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results in a finding that Claimant's injuries in the motor vehicle collision are compensable, as 
they were sustained within the course and scope of her employment. 
Despite the fact that Grant's participation in a voluntary work party is further removed 
from the employer's control than Claimant's compulsory attendance at an Employer-mandated 
medical evaluation, Grant has been relied on very few times by the Comi and the Commission. A 
perusal of reported workers' compensation cases reveals that the Court's decision in Grant has 
been taken into consideration only four times in the last 32 years to support compensability. 
The Court has already adopted the same reasoning that Claimant is now invoking. 
Employer's argument of unlimited application avoids addressing the issue before the Court, 
ignores the analysis set forth in Grant, and disregards Grant's limited application over the past 32 
years. 
IL CONCLUSION 
Claimant respectfully requests that the Court follow the majority of jurisdictions and find 
that Claimant's injuries sustained while traveling to an employer-mandated medical evaluation 
are compensable as part of her workers' compensation claim. 
Dated this ,-
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